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Pauling: Criminal Procedure - The Cumulative-Effect Approach to Plain Erro

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE-The Cumulative-Effect Approach to Plain
Error Analysis. Schmunk v. State, 714 P.2d 724 (Wyo. 1986).
Kay Schmunk suffered from severe migraine headaches for at least
six years. Early in the morning of July 15, 1983, her husband, Dr. Robert
Schmunk, injected her with three drugs, to relieve the pain of her latest
attack. Dr. Schmunk awoke at 6:30 a.m., found Kay near death, and unsuccessfully attempted to resuscitate her., Though the doctor informed
the emergency room physician of the injections, toxicology tests revealed
dosages of demerol and morphine that were three times what Dr. Schmunk
had reported. These findings indicated that Kay died from an acute narcotic overdose.23 Dr. Schmunk was later arrested for and convicted of first
degree murder.
On appeal Schmunk argued that the state failed to prove purpose and
premeditation in those acts leading to Kay's death. He contended that
his conviction was based solely upon speculation and innuendo created
by the erroneous admission of a videotaped interview, hearsay, and other
inadmissible evidence. He concluded that the prosecutor's success rested
on a theory that Schmunk had a "dark side," which he hid from his friends4
and community and which caused him to kill what was imperfect.
Schmunk claimed that the state's efforts to establish this theory upon
erroneously admitted evidence had the cumulative effect of denying him
a fair trial.5
Noting the multitude of errors in the trial record and the prosecutor's
exploitation of those errors, the Wyoming Supreme Court reversed
Schmunk's conviction and held that several errors, considered together,6
may sufficiently prejudice a defendant so as to deprive him of a fair trial.
Previously, in Browder v. State,7 the court labelled this treatment of multiuse
ple errors the cumulative effect approach." Despite the court's prior
9
of this approach, three justices declined to apply it in Schmunk.
To justify the court's reliance on the cumulative effect approach, this
casenote examines the policies which recommend and limit its use. This
casenote also investigates the characteristics of lower court proceedings
which have consistently convinced other appellate courts to apply the
© Copyright 1987, University of Wyoming. See copyright notice at the beginning of
this issue.
1. Brief and Appendix of Appellant Robert P. Schmunk at 2-3, Schmunk v. State, 714
P.2d 724 (Wyo. 1986) (No. 84-176).
2. Brief of Appellee at 3-4, Schmunk (No. 84-176).
3. Schmunk v. State, 714 P.2d 724, 726 (Wyo. 1986).
4. Id. at 741-42.
5. I& at 726-28.
6. Id. at 726.
7. 639 P.2d 889 (Wyo. 1982).
8. Id. at 895.
9. 714 P.2d at 745-46. Justice Brown concurred in reversing Schmunk's conviction,
but transformed Justice Cardine's cumulative effect approach into plurality dictum by his
refusal to apply it in this case. Justice Rooney, joined in dissent by Chief Justice Thomas,
found no reversible error in Schmunk's trial.
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cumulative effect approach in furthering those policies. Further examination shows that the cumulative effect approach ensures a fair trial without
unduly burdening the trial court.
BACKGROUND

The Cumulative Effect Approach and the Purposes of the PlainErrorRule
The errors on which the Schmunk court based its reversal could only
be considered if they rose to the level of plain error. 10 To reverse on the
ground of plain error, the court must find that the error materially prejudiced the appellant by denying him a substantial right." This requirement is derived from the policies underlying the federal plain error rule' 2
which Wyoming adopted as Rule 49(b) of the Wyoming Rules of Criminal
Procedure.1" The drafters designed the federal rule to protect the defendant from substantial and harmful error while preventing wholesale rever14
sal for harmless error.
Typically, courts apply the plain error rule only to obvious errors or
serious deficiencies affecting the fairness, integrity, or public reputation
of the judicial proceeding.'" Courts restrict the use of plain error to prevent parties from gambling on a favorable verdict and then resorting to
an appeal on errors that might have been corrected by a timely objection. 6
Thus, in exercising the rule, courts must balance the waste of judicial
resources, occasioned by giving effect to harmless error, against the possible prejudice to the defendant's right to a fair trial. 7
The restricted use of the plain error rule suggests that appellate courts
require such errors to be so substantial and serious that, unlike ordinary
reversible errors, no objection is needed to apprise the court of the objec10. Because Schmunk failed to properly object to both the relevancy of certain hearsay and the admission of his refusal to take a lie detector test, the court's review was constrained by Wyo. R. EvID. 103, which provides in part:
(a) Error may not be predicated upon a ruling which admits or excludes evidence
unless a substantial right of the party is affected, and
(1) In case the ruling is one admitting evidence, a timely objection...
appears of record ....
(d) Nothing in this rule precludes taking notice of plain errors affecting substantial rights although they were not brought to the attention of the court.
11. Schmunk, 714 P.2d at 739.
12. The Wyoming plain error rule is identical to FED. R. EvWD. 103(a)(1), -(d). In the
absence of Wyoming precedent, the court should rely on federal decisions. Hays v. State,
522 P.2d 1004, 1007 (Wyo. 1974).
13. Wyo. R. CRIM. P. 49 provides:

(a) Any error, defect, irregularity or variance which does not affect substantial rights shall be disregarded.
(b) Plain error or defects affecting substantial rights may be noticed although
they were not brought to the attention of the court.
This rule is identical to FED. R. CRIM. P. 52.

14.
15.
16.
17.

Steele v. United States, 243 F.2d 712, 715 (5th Cir. 1957).
United States v. Jacquillon, 469 F.2d 380, 386 (5th Cir. 1972).
Id.
United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 163 (1982).
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tionable matter. However, no clear and objective standard exists to aid
the courts in determining when that degree of seriousness is reached. Decisions finding plain error indicate that those findings depend upon the circumstances of a particular case.' Such results should be expected because
an error's effect may be minor in one setting but crucial in another. The
interplay between the participants in a trial, the potential consequences
of the verdict, and the significance of the error in light of the other
evidence, influence the jury's decision. The reviewing court should examine
all these circumstances when considering plain error.19 Thus, in elevating
an error to the status of plain error, the court must view that error, not
in isolation, but in light of the trial record as a whole. This consideration
of collateral circumstances and the extent to which they magnify the prejudicial effect of error has been called the cumulative effect approach. 0
Application of the Cumulative Approach: Federal Cases
The United States Supreme Court, in Berger v. United States,2' recognized that repeated prosecutorial misconduct could have a cumulative
prejudicial effect upon a defendant. The Court found that the prosecutor
repeatedly misstated facts, bullied witnesses, and suggested his personal
knowledge of facts not in evidence. Though Berger failed to object to many
of these tactics, the Supreme Court criticized the trial court for its failure
to curb the continuing improprieties. The Court suggested that the prosecutor's conduct might have been calculated to misuse the public's trust
in his office and to mislead the jury. Because the case was close, the Court,
in reversing Berger's conviction, refused to dismiss the probable cumulative effect of the prosecutor's acts upon the jury's decision. 21
While the Berger Court viewed the prosecutor's misconduct and the
trial court's continuing tolerance as one protracted instance of error, the
Second Circuit approached similar acts of misconduct in a different manner. In United States v. Semensohn,2 the defendant denied that he had
willfully evaded military service by furnishing false information to the
draft board. The prosecutor, while cross-examining Semensohn, improperly invited the jury to doubt the defendant's credibility, falsely suggesting
that Semensohn had previously committed a felony. Though the court
of appeals thought this to be reversible even in the absence of an objection, it chose not to reverse for that error alone. 4 The prosecutor also commented on the defendant's exercise of his right to remain silent. Though
the lack of a proper objection prevented the trial court from addressing
this issue, the court of appeals found the prosecutor's comments to be
18. Schmunk, 714 P.2d at 739.
19.
20.
21.
22.

Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 761-64 (1946).
Schmunk, 714 P.2d at 743.
295 U.S. 78 (1935).
Id. at 84-89.

23. 421 F.2d 1206 (2d Cir. 1970).
24. Id at 1207-09.
25. Id. at 1210.

Published by Law Archive of Wyoming Scholarship, 1987

3

Land & Water Law Review, Vol. 22 [1987], Iss. 2, Art. 20

LAND AND WATER LAW REVIEW

Vol. XXII

highly prejudicial. Because the case was close and the defendant's credibility crucial, the court found that the cumulative effect of the two instances
of prosecutorial misconduct had denied Semensohn a fair trial. 2
While the Semensohn Court clearly isolated individually reversible errors, the Supreme Court, in Berger, strained to characterize continuing
prosecutorial misconduct as one protracted reversible error. Such results
reflect the desire of these courts to ground their respective cumulative
approaches in at least one definitely reversible error.
The Second Circuit retreated from this position when, in the same year

2 6
as Semensohn, it decided United States v. Grunberger.
The defendant

in that case pleaded not guilty to charges that he had sold and transported
illegally imported watch movements. The sole witness to contradict
Grunberger's testimony held a grudge against him, stemming from prior
business dealings, and had agreed to inform on Grunberger only after both
had been indicted on similar charges. The court of appeals considered
several errors. The first error concerned the trial court's participation in
the direct examination of both the defendant and his accuser. Though the
content of the judge's questions and the impatient manner in which they
were posed displayed obvious disbelief of the defendant, the defendant
failed to object to those questions. He again failed to object when the prosecutor improperly offered his professional judgment and experience to the
jury as guaranteeing the truth of the state's evidence. Finally, the trial
court mistakenly instructed the jury that certain words spoken by the
defendant constituted an admission of guilt, even though Grunberger
claimed that he had been asking a question at the time." Ignoring the
individual sufficiency of these errors for reversal, the court of appeals
declared that it could not ignore the totality of the improprieties when
examining the fairness of the appellant's trial. The Second Circuit,
therefore, adopted the position that, when analyzing an alleged error, it
should examine the error's effect on the record as a whole, rather than
as an isolated event. 8 By de-emphasizing the individual errors, the court
modified the notion that such isolated events could be considered reversible without regard to other events at trial. In so doing, it abandoned the
need to ground its cumulative effect approach in a single and definitely
reversible error.
These cases have identified many of the factors which combine to prejudice the defendant. Typically, the evidence is close, and the defendant
is relying heavily on his own credibility. The trial record typically reveals
a series of errors. While appellate courts have claimed that one error contributes to another in the gradual growth of prejudice, they have consistently avoided a more detailed explanation of this process. Instead, they
have focused upon the more obvious process by which prosecutors in each
case have manipulated inadmissible evidence to disadvantage the defendant.
26. 431 F.2d 1062 (2d Cir. 1970).
27. Id. at 1066-69.
28. Id at 1069.
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Application of the Cumulative Effect Approach: Wyoming Cases
In Gabrielsonv. State,9 the state alleged that the defendant attacked
his companion with a knife after the latter rebuffed the defendant's homosexual advances. Prior to trial, the defendant moved to exclude evidence
concerning prior felony convictions and prior accusations of illegal homosexual acts. The Wyoming Supreme Court held that the trial court properly denied the appellant's motion regarding evidence of his prior convictions. The court, however, declared that mere accusations were consistent with innocence and that the trial court should have excluded them. 0
The court declined to comment upon the sufficiency of this error alone
as a ground for reversal; instead it discussed prosecutorial misconduct
as additional error. During cross-examination the prosecutor repeatedly
sought information which, though not related to the charged offense,
seriously damaged the defendant's credibility. The supreme court observed
that the prosecutor lacked evidence to support the inferences suggested
by these questions. It concluded that the state sought only to impugn
the appellant's character.31 Noting that the state's closing argument effectively asked the jury to convict solely on the basis of these attacks,
the court concluded that the cumulative effect of3 2all these errors prejudiced
the appellant and deprived him of a fair trial.
Nine years later, in Browder v. State,33 the Wyoming Supreme Court
took a slightly different approach to the cumulative effect doctrine. In
a manner similar to Berger, the court found the prosecutor's conduct to
be one protracted error.3 4 In Browder, the only evidence was the rape victim's identification of the defendant. The prosecutor, attacking the defendant's credibility, repeatedly attested to the truth of the state's evidence
and asserted his own beliefs as fact. Worse, he fabricated a description
of the events leading to the alleged attack, offering no evidence to support his allegations. 5
Though the defendant's closing argument outlined the weakness of
the state's case and pointed to the prosecutor's unsupported allegations,
the court found the defendant's right to a fair trial was severely prejudiced
by the prosecutor's rebuttal. The prosecutor offered the authority and
credibility of his office in lieu of evidence, asserting that the jury labelled
him a liar if it failed to convict. The court, considering the closeness of
the evidence against the defendant found it impossible to say that the
evidence, rather than the prosecutor's unfair tactics, had swayed the jury.
Though the appellant objected to none of the prosecutor's improprieties
29. 510 P.2d 534 (Wyo. 1973).
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.

Id. at 536.
Id. at 538.
Id. at 537-39.
639 P.2d 889 (Wyo. 1982).
Schmunk, 714 P.2d at 746.
Browder, 639 P.2d at 892-94.
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during trial, the supreme court determined that the cumulative effect of
the prosecutor's
conduct caused prejudicial error sufficient to require re6
versal.1
In these cases the Wyoming court applied the cumulative effect doctrine in a manner similar to that of the federal courts. In both jurisdictions the courts assess the role of the defendant's credibility in the jury's
decision. The courts then determine the extent to which the errors affected
that credibility. Finally, the courts examine the prosecutor's use of those
errors. In a close case, where the prosecutor intentionally fostered the
growth of prejudice, the court will be inclined to conclude that the defendant was denied a fair trial.
THE PRINCIPAL CASE

At trial, the state entered into evidence a videotaped pre-indictment
interview between Dr. Schmunk and the state's investigator. In the videotape, Schmunk declined to take a polygraph test because he had experienced problems with a prior polygraph test, taken in relation to certain
unnamed charges filed against him in Michigan.3 1 Schmunk successfully
moved to exclude any reference to the Michigan charges.38 When the trial
court admitted the videotape containing such references, Schmunk unsuccessfully moved for a mistrial. The court attempted to cure any prejudice by instructing the jury to ignore the objectionable portions of the
tape and by ordering those portions excised from the tape. The tape,
however, went to the jury during its deliberation, containing Dr.
Schmunk's refusal to submit to the polygraph examination. 9
The Wyoming Supreme Court concluded that the prosecutor impermissibly used Schmunk's refusal to establish "consciousness of guilt." 0
Therefore, the court held it to be error to inform the jury of Schmunk's
refusal. The court further suggested that the admission of this evidence
amounted to an improper reference to the exercise of Schmunk's right
to remain silent, which it has long held to be prejudicial error.4 ' The repetition of that error, that is, permitting the jury to view the tape again,
especially disturbed the court. The court suggested that such a practice
may be unfair regardless of the tape's content because it unduly emphasizes the testimony during the jury's deliberation. Here, the court concluded, this practice deprived Schmunk of a fair trial.4"
Schmunk also disputed the admission of certain hearsay evidence. Pursuant to Rule 804(b)(6) of the Wyoming Rules of Evidence,"3 the state
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.

Id. at 894-95.
Schmunk, 714 P.2d at 728.
Id. at 728-29.
I& at 729-32.
Id. at 732-33.
Id. at 733 n.2.
Id. at 733, 744.
Wyo. R. EVID. 8041b)(6) provides:
Other Exceptions.-A statement not specifically covered by any of the foregoing
exceptions but having equivalent circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness,
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served Dr. Schmunk with two separate notices, indicating that it would
introduce hearsay regarding Kay's statements to her family about her
dissatisfaction with her husband. Schmunk failed to object to the first
notice but did object to the second notice which was served two days
before trial. He complained that the second notice was too late; that it
did not satisfy the requirements, spirit, or intent of the rule; and that it
did not afford him a fair opportunity to meet the evidence. The trial court
overruled the objection, permitting Kay Schmunk's mother to present her
testimony.4 '
The Wyoming Supreme Court declared that hearsay is inadmissible
unless it strictly conforms to one of the exceptions provided by the Wyoming Rules of Evidence. The second notice, arriving two days before the
trial, did not meet the notice requirements of the rule. The court indicated
that the failure to give sufficient notice is excusable when the proponent
is not at fault. The state, however, possessed the evidence for nine months.
The court held it error to admit such evidence over Schmunk's objections.45
Schmunk failed to object to evidence in the earlier notice but claimed
on appeal that it was, nevertheless, inadmissible. The supreme court
agreed, explaining that Rule 804(b)(6) requires hearsay to be evidence of
a material fact. The court suggested that, had the doctor's knowledge of
his wife's intentions affected his actions or motives, the hearsay statements describing those intentions might satisfy the materiality requirement. The state, however, offered no evidence suggesting the doctor's
knowledge of Kay's plans to leave him. Kay's state of mind was, therefore,
irrelevant. Finding that the record clearly showed the error and violated
a clear and unequivocal rule of law, the court held that the admission of
this hearsay under Rule 804(b)(6) was reviewable as plain error."8
The court explained, however, that a defect can only rise to the level
of plain error if it is somehow more fundamental or serious than reversible error and if it materially prejudices the defendant.' 7 Responding to
the dissenting justice's concern with the specificity of Schmunk's objection to the admission of the videotaped interview, 48 the court conceded
that the issues raised by that admission also might be reviewable only
if the court determines that (A) the statement is offered as evidence of a material
fact; (B) the statement is more probative on the point for which it is offered
than any other evidence which the proponent can procure through reasonable
efforts; and (C) the general purposes of these rules and interest of justice will
best be served by admission of the statement into evidence. However, a statement may not be permitted under this exception unless the proponent of it
makes known to the adverse party sufficiently in advance of the trial or hearing to provide the adverse party with a fair opportunity to prepare to meet
it, his intention to offer the statement and the particulars of it, including the
name and address of the declarant.
This rule is identical to FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(5).
44. Schmunk, 714 P.2d at 736-38.
45. Id. at 737-38.
46. Id. at 739-40.
47. Id. 739.
48. Id. at 749-50.
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as plain error.49 Thus, the court felt obliged to show that the effects of
admitting the videotape and the hearsay were sufficiently serious to justify
a finding of plain error. To establish this required degree of seriousness
and to demonstrate the extent to which Schmunk had been prejudiced
by these errors the court resorted to the cumulative effect approach to
plain error analysis.
This approach isolates several factors which increase the prejudicial
impact of errors, including: the importance of the defendant's credibility
to his case, the evidentiary closeness of the case, the number of errors
and their seriousness, the repetition of errors, and the extent to which
the prosecuting attorney created and built upon those errors to the defendant's detriment. Nearly all of these factors were present in Schmunk's
trial.
Schmunk offered, as his only defense, the credibility of his profession
of innocence. The court thought it unlikely that his credibility could be
restored after exposing the jury to such prejudicial materials as the
videotape and Kay's hearsay statements.50 Futhermore, the court reasoned
that repeating the doctor's refusal to take a lie detector test had so damaged Schmunk's credibility that it seriously prejudiced his right to a fair
trial. 51 Finally, the many serious errors in the case convinced the court
that Schmunk could not have obtained a fair trial under such deficient
proceedings. 52
The court also suggested that the prosecutor played a significant role
in prejudicing Dr. Schmunk because he controlled the videotape and was
primarily responsible for introducing that excluded material into evidence.5" Similarly, the prosecutor had Kay Schmunk's hearsay statements
in his possession for nine months. 4 Noting that the notice requirement
could be excused where the proponent was
not at fault, the court refused
5
to excuse the prosecutor in this case.
The most damaging prosecutorial conduct, however, occurred in his
closing argument when the prosecutor advanced the theory that Schmunk
had a "dark side," which caused him to kill what was imperfect. The court
observed that the state offered no direct evidence supporting that theory,
but instead played upon the inferences drawn from evidence which was
both inadmissible and prejudicial.9 Because the material had been admitted into evidence at the trial, the court found the prosecutor's reference
to it permissible. The court, however, having now found that evidence to
49. Id at 744.
50. Id at 731-32.
51. Id. 733.
52. Id. at 745.
53. Id at 728-30.
54. Id at 736.
55. Id at 736-37.
56. Id at 742-43.
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be inadmissible, concluded that such reference aggravated those errors
impermissible inferences, and deprived Schmunk of a
by accumulating
7
fair trial.1
The concurring opinion' s objected to the cumulative effect approach,
if the court meant merely to combine several small, non-prejudicial errors
in a decision to reverse. Justice Brown suggested that the cumulative effect approach was a vague concept which implied that no individual errors were sufficient to justify reversal. Because he found the individual
errors to be reversible, Justice Brown proposed that the cumulative error concept unnecessarily cast doubt on those findings.
The dissenters 9 also criticized the plurality's reasoning as the mere
addition of harmless errors. Recognizing, however, that such reasoning
also represented the court's approach to the analysis of plain error, Justice
Rooney restricted his criticism of the cumulative effect approach accordingly. Since plain error arises only in the absence of an objection, he argued
that the plurality's approach would force a trial court to "keep score" of
harmless errors and interfere with counsels' role in presenting the case.
ANALYSIS

These criticisms indicate that Justice Cardine, in his plurality opinion,
did not clearly explain the cumulative effect approach. Because a majority of the court found certain errors sufficiently prejudicial to require reversal, an accumulation of prejudice seems superfluous. Justice Cardine's
finding of reversibility, though, refers only to the situation that would
exist had there been a proper objection in the trial court. Because he felt
that plain error must rise to a level of seriousness beyond ordinary reversibility, Justice Cardine employed the cumulative effect approach to
demonstrate such seriousness. To avoid criticism that its cumulative effect approach encourages reversals based upon a string of trivial errors,
the court had to show that some of those errors would have, in the presence
of an objection, required reversal. Because it must also establish that those
errors could rise to the status of plain error, the court had to demonstrate
through the cumulative error approach that prejudice had accumulated
so as to seriously affect the fairness of Schmunk's trial.
The court's use of the cumulative effect approach suggests two aspects
of its attitude towards the analysis of error. First, it suggests the court's
view that certain errors, because they have a great potential to prejudice
the defendant, demand careful scrutiny. Second, it suggests the belief that
a reviewing court cannot evaluate an error's impression on a jury if it ignores other factors which contribute to that impression. This analytical
posture is crucial if the court is to realistically assess the effects of prejudicial error and assure the defendant a fair trial.
57. Id.
58. Id at 745 (Brown, J., dissenting).
59. Id. (Rooney, J., dissenting).
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Prejudice towards the defendant may significantly influence the jury's
willingness to transform inferences into proof. Such prejudice arises when
the jury is invited to speculate upon what evidence suggests rather than
what it is capable of proving. This situation occurred twice during Dr.
Schmunk's trial. The prosecutor's introduction of evidence concerning Kay
Schmunk's desire to leave her husband invited the jury to infer that Dr.
Schmunk knew of her feelings and that he killed her because of them. The
prosecutor also invited the inference that Schmunk's refusal to take a lie
detector test proved him guilty of murder.
In both instances the jury, relying on the prosecutor's trustworthiness,
was not likely to distinguish between what the prosecutor proved and what
he sought to prove. The jury might naturally assume that Kay's feelings
proved that the Schmunks had an unhappy marriage. The prosecutor, however, introduced no other evidence to that effect, establishing only that
Kay claimed to have had such feelings. The jury could also have decided
that Dr. Schmunk's refusal to take the lie detector test proved that his
claims of innocence were lies. The prosecutor, however, failed to provide
evidence that Schmunk was insincere. He only succeeded in showing that
Schmunk would take his chances at trial.
If criminal convictions are to be based upon proof beyond a reasonable
doubt, the courts must require that the jury's inferences be guided by
fact, rather than mere suggestion. Because innuendo may carry the jury
beyond the facts, trial courts must adhere to those rules which limit the
admissibility of evidence according to its trustworthiness and its probative
value. Mistakes occur, however, and the trial court's conclusions about
the prejudicial effect of such mistakes must be based on present events
and experienced guesswork. The court cannot accurately predict how
future events will affect the prejudicial impact of certain evidence.
Therefore, appellate courts must closely examine erroneously admitted
evidence to determine whether the jury made impermissible use of it.
Because this determination is highly speculative, the Wyoming Supreme
Court wisely chose to widen its inquiry through its use of the cumulative
effect approach. By noting the use of the offending evidence throughout
the trial, the court more accurately assessed its prejudicial effect upon
the jury's decision.
Attempts to evaluate the prejudicial impact of an evidentiary error
by isolating it from the rest of the proceedings ignores an important fact.
The jury evaluates each piece of evidence only in relation to other evidence
which either contradicts it or supports it. Guided by the suggestions and
criticisms of the opposing counsel, the jury accumulates probabilities to
arrive at its decision. The Wyoming Supreme Court correctly recognized
that no analysis of an error's prejudicial effect on that jury decision could
ignore this process.
If a piece of evidence predisposes the jury against the defendant, it
will very likely affect the jury's evaluation of other evidence. If that
evidence was erroneously admitted and suggestive of inferences beyond
https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/land_water/vol22/iss2/20
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those which the remaining evidence could support, such effect was
achieved unfairly. The addition of similar errors during the trial increases
the probability that those errors contributed to the gradual prejudgment
of the defendant. Such prejudgment becomes especially harmful when
properly admitted evidence is inconclusive. The jury's decision, which
might otherwise rest largely on the defendant's credibility, will then rest
on unobservable and unsupported speculation.
Though this predisposition against the defendant can grow spontaneously, a diligent prosecutor can contribute significantly to the speed
and direction of that growth. An overzealous prosecutor attempting to
buttress an unconvincing case can condemn the defendant to an unfair
trial. When he fails to disclose his intention to offer prejudicial evidence
and violates the trial court's orders to exclude prejudicial evidence, such
a prosecutor gains an unfair advantage. When, as in Schmunk's case, he
ignores weak though properly admitted evidence and resolves the material
issues of a capital offense by reference to unsupported inferences, he unfairly builds upon the prejudice he has created. The Wyoming Supreme
Court properly recognized the prosecutor's ability to create and nurture
prejudice by its adoption of the cumulative effect approach to plain error
analysis.
This approach recognizes a distinction between the trial court's duty
to manage a fair trial and the appellate court's duty to ensure a fair trial.
While the trial court could not anticipate the prosecutor's use of evidence
nor the jury's evaluation of it, the reviewing court can examine the entire
trial process. The trial court, therefore, should not be expected to evaluate
errors except as they are individually raised by objection, but the appellate
court need not limit itself to the type of review available to the trial court.
CONCLUSION

The Wyoming Supreme Court reversed Schmunk's conviction, not
upon an accumulation of harmless error, but rather as a reaffirmation of
the purposes of traditional plain error doctrine. These purposes, as embodied in both the Federal and Wyoming Rules of Criminal Procedure,
cannot be achieved by attempts to standardize and define the concept of
plain error. The integrity and fairness of judicial proceedings can only be
evaluated by a thorough examination of the entire proceeding. By determining the effect of error over the course of the entire trial, this cumulative
effect approach seeks to ensure that the entire proceeding was just and
that the defendant, indeed, received a fair trial.
MICHAEL PAULING

Published by Law Archive of Wyoming Scholarship, 1987

11

Land & Water Law Review, Vol. 22 [1987], Iss. 2, Art. 20

https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/land_water/vol22/iss2/20

12

